Abstract-We consider the problem of distributed decision making in a quadratic game between a team of players and nature. Each player has limited information that could be different from the other players in the team. We show that if there is a solution to the minimax team problem, then the linear policies are optimal, and we show how to find the linear optimal solution by solving a linear matrix inequality. The result is used to solve the distributed H∞ control problem. It shows that information exchange with neighbours on the graph only, is enough to obtain a linear optimal policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of static minimax team decision. A team of players are to optimize a worst case scenario given limited information of nature's decision for each player. The problem can be considered as the deterministic analog of the stochastic team decision problems that were solved by Radner [7] .
An initial step for solving the static deterministic problem was made by Didinsky and Basar [3] , where they consider a team of two players using a stochastic framework. The solution given in [3] cannot easily be extended to more than two players, since it uses common information for the two players, a property that does not necessarily exist for more than two players. Also, the one step delay H ∞ control problem is solved in [3] .
In this paper, we solve the static minimax (or deterministic) team decision problem completely for an arbitrary number of players, and show that the optimal solution is linear and can be found by solving a linear matrix inequality. Also, we show how to solve the dynamic finite-horizon H ∞ control problem, under some conditions that prevent signaling, which is analogous to the distributed finite-horizon stochastic LQG problem treated in Ho and Chu [4] and its generalization in Gattami [6] . For the infinite-horizon problem, similar conditions were obtained in [1] and [8] . We show that the information structure where subsystems on a graph are restricted to exchange information with neighbours only, is enough to obtain an optimal feedback law which turns out to be linear. This reveals a broader class of information structures that lead to tractable problems.
II. NOTATION
For a vector v, we denote the ith block component of v by v i . The set of n×n symmetric matrices is denoted by S n . The pseudo-inverse of a matrix A is denoted by A † . We write A 0 (A ≻ 0) to denote that A is positive semi-definite (positive definite). For matrix A partitioned symmetrically in blocks, we denote the block in position
III. THE MINIMAX TEAM DECISION PROBLEM
Consider the following team decision problem
where
where Qxx Qxu Qux Quu ∈ S m+n .
We will be interested in the case Q uu ≻ 0 (this can be generalized to Q uu 0, but the presentation of the paper becomes more technical). The players u 1 ,..., u N make up a team, which plays against nature represented by the vector x, using µ(x) = µ
T .
Proposition 1:
The value of the game in (1) is γ * if and only if for any ǫ > 0 there is a decision µ ǫ such that
Proof: The statement follows immediately from the definition of the infimum.
Proposition (1) shows that if γ * is the value of the game in (1), then for any given real number γ > γ * , there exists a policy µ such that J(x, µ(x)) − γ x 2 ≤ 0 for all x. Hence, we can formulate the alternative team decision problem:
The formulation above can be seen as the problem of looking for suboptimal solutions to the game given by (1) . Clearly, Proposition 1 shows that the value of the game resulting from the decision obtained in (2) approaches the optimal value in (1) as γ approaches γ * (or as ǫ → 0). From now on we will consider the equivalent game given by (2) . Introduce the matrix
C is a p × n matrix, where p = p 1 + p 2 + · · · + p N . For any given vector y, a vector x with y = Cx can be written as x = C † y + (I − C † C)ỹ, for someỹ.x = (I − C † C)ỹ can be seen as the unobservable part of x from the vector y, andx = C † y is the observable part. We will now show how to eliminate the unobservable part of x from our problem. Define
and let V be given by
Then,
Let V T Q γ V be partitioned as
Thus, we have
Then, the game (2) can be equivalently formulated as
Proposition 2: Let Z be the matrix given by (6) . Then, the value of the game
can be zero only if Z 11 0.
Proof: If Z 11 0, thenỹ can be chosen in the direction of the eigenvector corresponding to the positive eigenvalue of Z 11 , which makes the value of the game arbitrarily large. Hence, a necessary condition for the game to have value zero is that Z 11 0.
To ease the exposition of the paper, we will consider the case where Z 11 ≺ 0. The case where Z 11 is semi-definite can be treated similarly, but is more technical, and therefore omitted here.
Proof: Completion of squares gives  ỹ y u
where F is given by
Since Z 11 ≺ 0, the quadratic form in (9) is maximized for y = −F y u , which proves our proposition.
Introduce now the matrix
(11) Recall that Z 33 = Q uu ≻ 0, and Z 11 ≺ 0, which implies that Q 22 ≻ 0. Now using Proposition (3), the game described by (7) reduces to
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Hence, we consider the problem of finding policies µ i (y i ) such that u i = µ i (y i ) and
for all x. Now we are ready to state the main result of the paper where we show linearity of the optimal decisions:
then there exist linear policies µ i (y i ) = K i y i that satisfy (13).
Proof: Assume existence of policy µ that satisfies (13). If y i = C i x = 0 for some i, then the optimal decision for player i is to set µ i (0) = 0. To see this, take y = 0. Then
Since Q 22 ≻ 0, we see that µ(0) = 0 is the optimal decision. In particular, µ i (0) = 0 is the optimal decision for decision maker i. Now suppose that
for i = 1, ..., N . Also, define K(x) as
It is easy to check that (13) is equivalent to
Hence, we have obtained an equivalent problem for which the existence of policies µ i is the same as the existence of matrix functions K 1 (y 1 ), ..., K N (y N ) and K(x) satisfying (15) and (16). Note that the problem of searching for linear policies corresponds to that of searching for constant matrices K i (C i x) = K i . Furthermore, (16) is equivalent to the problem of finding a matrix function M (X) such that
(17) To see this, take a matrix M (X) satisfying (17), for X = xx (17) is satisfied. Now if for a given matrix X = 0 and M = M (X) the inequality in (17) is satisfied, then the same matrix M satisfies (17) with the matrix X/Tr X instead of X. Thus, since we are considering matrices X = xx T = 0, it is enough to consider matrices X with Tr X = 1. Define the set
Then (17) implies that
We will now extend the set of matrices X from S 1 to the set S = {X : X 0, Tr X = 1}.
That is, we will consider the extended problem
Clearly, we have that
CX.
(20) Let M * (X) be the optimal decision to the extended minimax problem (19), and suppose that
for some real number α. This is equivalent to
is the dual to the following convex optimization problem (see Boyd et al [2] ):
Strong duality holds since the primal problem (22) is convex (Q 22 ≻ 0) and Slater's condition is satisfied, see [2] . Thus, existence of a decision matrix M (X) = M * (X) fulfilling (21) implies existence of a constant matrix M (X) = K that fulfills
Now take any positive semi-definite matrix X of rank k ≤ n and TrX = 1. Then, we can write X as [5] , pp.457). Let
This gives together with equation (23):
Let X j be the matrix for which
Hence, we have proved that the worst case is attained for a matrix X with rank 1, and the extension of the set S 1 to the set S does not increase the cost. We conclude that the optimal decision can be taken to be a linear decision with µ(y) = Ky, and the proof is complete.
IV. COMPUTATION OF THE OPTIMAL TEAM DECISION
In the previous section we showed that for the minimax team problem given by (2), the linear policy u = KCx is optimal, where K is given by
Now the problem of finding linear policies satisfying (16) can be written as the following convex feasability problem:
where Q 22 ≻ 0 The inequality in (25) can be written as where
22 Q 21 C. First note that a necessary condition for which (26) to be satisfied is that R 0. If R 0, then using the Schur complement gives that inequality (26) can be written as an LMI
0, which can be computationally solved efficiently.
V. RELATION WITH THE STOCHASTIC MINIMAX TEAM DECISION PROBLEM
In this section we consider the stochastic minimax team decision problem
Taking the expectation of the cost in the stochastic problem above yields the equivalent problem
where X is a positive semi-definite matrix, and is the covariance matrix of x, i. e. X = E xx T . Hence, we see that the stochastic minimax team problem is equivalent to the deterministic minimax team problem, where nature maximizes with respect to all covariance matrices X of the stochastic variable x with variance E x 2 = E x T x = Tr X = 1.
VI. TEAM DECISION PROBLEMS AND SIGNALING
Consider a modified version of the static team problem posed in the previous section, where the observation y i for every decision maker i is affected by the inputs of the other decision makers, that is
where D ij = 0 if decision maker j does not affect the observation y i . The modified optimization problem becomes
The problem above is in general very complex if decision maker i does not have access to the information about the decisions u i that appear in y i . We say that the problem give rise to a signaling incentive for decision maker j. If we assume that decision maker i has the value of u j available for every j such that D ij = 0, then she can form the new output measurement given y ī
which transforms the problem to a static team problem without signaling, and the optimal solution is linear and can be found according to Theorem 1 and section IV. Note that if decision maker i has the information available that every decision maker j has, then the decision u j is also available to decision maker i.
VII. DISTRIBUTED H ∞ CONTROL
In this section, we will treat the distributed linear quadratic H ∞ control problem with information constraints, which can be seen as a dynamic team decision problem. The idea is to transform the dynamic team problem to a static one, and then explore information structures for every time step.
Consider an example of four dynamically coupled systems according to the graph in Figure 1 . The equations for the interconnected system are given by    
.
(28) For instance, the arrow from node 2 to node 1 in the graph means that the dynamics of system 2 are directly affected by system 2, which is reflected in the system matrix A, where the block A 21 = 0. On the other hand, system 2 does not affect system 1 directly, which implies that A 12 = 0. Because of the "physical" distance between the subsystems, there will be some constraints on the information available to each node.
The observation of system i at time k is given by
Here, C ij = 0 if system i does not have access to y j (k). The subsystems could exchange information about their outputs. Every subsystem recieves the information with some time delay, that is reflected by the interconnection structure. Let I k i denote the set of observations y j (n) and control signals u j (n) available to node i up to time k, n ≤ k, j = 1, ..., N . Consider the following (general) dynamic team decision problem:
pi . Now write x(k) and y(k) as
Note that the summation over n is defined to be zero when t = 0. Theorem 2: Consider the optimization problem given by (30). The problem has no signaling incentive if and only if
for all n such that 0 ≤ n < t, and t = 0, ..., M − 1.
In addition, an optimal solution to the optimization problem given by (30) is linear in the observations I k i if condition (33) is satisfied, and has a solution that can be found by solving a linear matrix inequality.
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Proof: Introducē
. . .
Then, we can write the cost function J(x, u) as
Consider the expansion given by (32). The problem here is that y i (k) depends on previous values of the control signals u(n) for n = 0, ..., k − 1. The components u j (k − n − 1) that y i (k) depends on are completely determined by the structure of the matrix [C i A n B] ij . This means that, to avoid signaling, it is enough for node i to have the information of u j (k−n−1) available at time k if the element [C i A n B] ij = 0. Thus, we have proved the first statement of the theorem. Now if condition (33) is satisfied, we can form the new output measuremenť
Letȳ
With these new variables introduced, the optimization problem given by equation (30) reduces to the following static team decision problem:
and the optimal solutionū is linear according to Theorem 1, and can be obtained by solving a linear matrix inequality as described in section IV, QED.
In fact, using the static team formulation reveals a much more general information structure. It turns out to be enough to exchange information with the neighbours on the graph. We illustrate this by an example: Example 1: Consider the example presented at the beginning of this section. The dynamics of the second subsystem is given by x 2 (k + 1) = A 21 x 1 (k) + A 22 x 2 (k) + B 2 u 2 (k) + w 2 (k).
If at time k + 1, subsystem 2 has information about the state of its neighbours x 1 (k), then it has knowledge about the value of w 2 (k):
Hence, if we restrict the control law u 2 (k+1) to be a function of x 1 (k), x 2 (k), u 2 (k) (information about the state of its neighbour and its own state and control input at time step k), and restrict it to be based only on the information about w 2 (k), then we can set u 2 (k + 1) = µ 2 (w 2 (k)). The same information restriction can be similarly imposed on the other subsystems. Just as before, the dynamic H ∞ team problem can be reduced to the static team problem (35), where u i (k+ 1) = µ i (w i (k)). This problem has an optimal solution that is linear and can be found by solving a linear matrix inequality.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have fully solved the minimax (or deterministic) team decision problem completely for an arbitrary number of players, and show that the optimal solution is linear and can be found by solving a linear matrix inequality. Also, we show how to solve the finite-horizon H ∞ control problem, under some conditions that prevent signaling, which is analogous to the distributed stochastic LQG problem treated in Gattami [6] . It turns out that the information structure restricted to exchange information with neighbours only from one time step in the past, is enough to obtain a linear optimal feedback by solving a linear matrix inequality. This marks a starting point for a broader class of information structures that lead to tractable problems, which will be the subject for future work.
